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4We want to see Action!”
On Kierkegaard’s Ethical Instruction2
B e g o n y a  S å e z  T a ja fuerce
‘T h is  s h a d o w -e x is te n c e  is th e  sec re t o f  th e  s y s te m , knowing about, n o t  b e in g ’ 
(P a p . V I I I 1 A  5 5 4 / J P  6 4 6 )
‘I n s tr u c tio n  in  e th ic a l c a p a b i l i ty  is  e s s e n t ia l ly  u p b r in g in g ’
(P ap . V I I I 2  B  8 5 ,  t O / J P  6 5 3 )
In 1837, fifty years after the publication of Kants K r i t i k  d er  re in e n  Ver- 
n u n f t  and after having attended some courses on Kant s Ethics taught by 
H.L. Martensen3 at the Theology Faculty of the University of Copen­
hagen, a very young Søren Kierkegaard writes:
It seems that, by Kant, Philosophy went bankrupt theoretically speak­
ing so it was a question of whether there was something left to be saved 
on the practical way.4
Subtly echoing Kants suspicion and diagnosis regarding the limits of 
theoretical philosophy,5 Kierkegaard will remain faithful to and consis­
tent with this p ra ctica l tu r n , as it were, throughout his works, and he will 
drive it to its ultimate consequences, making it the core of his whole 
thought. But to set the record straight, let me state that, in the follow­
ing, I will not be making a comparison between Kant and Kierkegaard, 
not even of their critical approaches to philosophy as sheer th e o re m , 
something which they obviously share. Rather, I will attempt to illus­
trate the ways and means by which Kierkegaard, as opposed to Kant, de­
picts a h e u r is tic  proposal which determines and, thus, sharpens the edges 
of the philosophical task and, specifically, of practical philosophy or ethics.
According to Kierkegaard, if there is something to be saved in philoso­
phy, this is indeed its ‘practical way’. On the one hand, ‘practical way’
might be read here as the task of philosophizing, that is, the task of ap­
propriating philosophical knowledge by rational means, namely, by ap­
propriating at the same time the operating principles of reason. On the 
other hand, a ‘practical way’ designates a specific philosophical ground, 
namely ethics, which is neither solely nor mainly epistemologically de­
termined but, on the contrary, practically determined, i.e., determined 
by means of a c tio n . In this ‘way’, the task of philosophy is, thus, to d e ­
m a n d . Indeed, in Kierkegaard’s view, this is precisely what the times 
[from a philosophical perspective] need,
What the world needs most of all right now is this You shall, pro­
nounced with authority. This is the only thing that can give impetus.6
In other words, all philosophical undertakings and ethical philosophical 
undertakings in particular are therefore legitimate if and only if they aim 
at philosophizing, and thereby, at action; such undertakings are thus le­
gitimate insofar as they bring about action. To do so, philosophy and/or 
ethics must serve and be grounded directly upon an existential concern, 
which, in Johannes Climacus’ condensed formulation in the C o n c lu d in g  
U n sc ie n tific  P o s tc r ip t, reads as follows:
However, in order to avoid confusion, it should immediately be kept in 
mind that the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about the 
individual’s relation to Christianity, consequently not about the indif­
ferent individual’s systematic eagerness to arrange the truths of Chris­
tianity in § [paragraphs] but rather about the concern of the infinitely 
interested individual in regard to his own relation to such a doctrine.7
Very much aware of, and sensitive to, this ‘main confusion’ of modern 
times, Kierkegaard repeatedly warns against the cardinal sources, one by 
one, of all mistreatment of ethical truth, all deeply rooting in the fact that:
men still treat Christianity as a problem of knowledge, so that Christian 
knowledge in and for itself has value in the same sense as, for example, 
mathematics, history, and so on, intellectual disciplines which are not 
related to what kind of life a man lives, his character.8
As Kierkegaard himself maintains,9 it seems to follow from the above that 
neither science nor scholarship can provide a non-dogmatic, that is, a le­
gitimate topos for the teaching of the ethical truths or contents wherein 
these become nothing more than academic chimeras or numerical ac­
countings of human relationships. Kierkegaard’s main critical point in 
this discussion is that both science and scholarship are unable to bridge 
‘ideality’ and ‘reality’, and thus, allow these ethical truths to escape mere 
thought and enter into actual existence, simply because science and 
scholarship are indifferent to ‘the task’ and, hence, indifferent towards 
existence, and/or a c tio n . In Kierkegaard’s own words:
Nowadays everything is admonition, directed only toward understand­
ing, so that the child understands that one wishes him well, etc. -  but it 
actually has no connection with existence.10
Expanding upon his pragmatic criticism while also indirectly asking 
about the way in which philosophy, and/or ethics might succeed in ful­
filling ‘the task’ of bringing about (ethical) action, Kierkegaard quotes 
Socrates in order to essentially point out that ethical truths or contents 
(i.e., ‘the difference between good and evil’, as Judge William, the ethi­
cal rigorist, would put it in E i t h e r / O r  I I ) cannot be taught:11
This Socratic thesis is of outmost importance to Christianity: Virtue 
cannot be taught; that is, it is not a doctrine, it is a being-able { K u n -  
n e n ), an exercising, an existing, an existential transformation, and there­
fore it is so slow to learn, not at all as simple and easy as the rote-learn­
ing of one more language or one more system.12
Hence, what must be conveyed in this realm is not in fo rm a tio n  or k n o w l ­
edge but an a b il i ty  or b e in g -a b le .13 At this point, Kierkegaard considers a 
second type of what he calls ‘instruction’, upon which the bridge be­
tween ideality and reality might rest. This methodological point, fol­
lowed by an itemized heuristical p r o p o sa l, is based on the following in­
sight as found in his journals:
The difference of all instruction is essentially only this — in what medi­
um is the instruction to be communicated? Children and young people 
are instructed in the medium of the ideality of imagination. What is 
said there is true. And yet this very truth can become a trap in the 
medium of actuality. It is taught that one ought to love the good. Inas­
much as we all learn this, if we all acted accordingly, the medium of ac­
tuality would be just as ideal as the medium of imagination. But this is 
not the case. Then comes the last instruction. It teaches exactly the 
same thing as was taught to the young, but in addition it teaches how 
things go in the medium of actuality -  that the good is persecuted.14
The interesting turn in this quotation — what is called the ‘addition’ of 
this second kind of instruction -  is that it accentuates the medium of ac­
tuality as opposed to the medium of imagination. For this reason, the 
‘last instruction’ underlines the trace of a fundamental misproportion be­
tween the o u g h t to be (ideality) and the is (reality) found in actuality, the 
very misproportion where ‘last instruction’ itself originates. Insofar, the 
‘practical way’ of philosophy is principally a n e g a tiv e  way. Nonetheless, 
the ‘last instruction’ bears witness to a duty towards the actualization of 
ethical truths, compelling one furthermore to ‘act accordingly’ all the 
while stressing the risks of doing so. The ‘last instruction’ focuses not on 
the a priori of action and hence on its ideal conditions and presupposi­
tions, but on its a p o s te r io r i and, thus, on its actual fulfillment and ‘conse­
quence’. Here, the ‘practical way’ of philosophy is principally a positive 
way.
In this dialectical guise, Kierkegaard succeeds in shedding light upon 
the specific deficit of the ‘first’ mode of instruction. And this is two­
fold. On the one hand, Kierkegaard’s reflection performs an e v a lu a tiv e  
m o v e , by claiming that by no means do ideality or imagination overlap 
reality or actuality; on the contrary, Kierkegaard stresses their infinite 
distance. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s reflection simultaneously per­
forms a n o r m a tiv e  m o v e  by negatively requiring this infinite distance to be 
reduced; thus, ethical truths should no longer be understood in abstracto  
as idea(l)s nor under the subjunctive verbal tense, as ‘ifs’, but rather they 
should be translated into the present tense: they should be actualized. In 
other (key)words, considered from a Christian perspective, ethics should 
not be seen as ‘a doctrine but [as] an existence-communication’.15 I 
would like to make Kierkegaard’s point extensive and advocate for the 
same qualification of ethics sen so  la tu .
Thus, by stressing actuality, i.e., action and existence, legitimate ethi­
cal instruction is not only said to affect but also to occur within two do­
mains, namely within im a g in a t io n  or ideality on the one hand, which al­
lows a representation of the ethical by intellectual and/or poetic means,16 
and, on the other, within a c tu a lity  or reality, the existential domain, 
hence allowing a practical determination of the ethical, i.e., its coming
tru e . And now that we have been presented the double dynamics of 
Kierkegaardian ethical instruction, let us observe its character.
In order to grasp the nature of Kierkegaard’s ethical instruction, as 
well as its methodological implications, attention will be paid to those 
remarks in his journals, the propositional content of which might para- 
digmatically be referred to as follows: ‘The instruction, the communica­
tion, must not be as of knowledge, but upbringing, practising, a r t- in s tru c ­
tio n  .17 Tacitely, this remark seems to answer the essentially Socratic ques­
tion of h o w  ethics should be taught in order to bring about the ethical 
or, explicitly, its Kierkegaardian reformulation: h o w  is the ethical to be 
communicated so as to perform an ‘existence-communication’. In this 
respect, my undertaking begins just where the Kierkegaardian text sug­
gests: that is, with Socrates.
The Socratic philosophical undertaking as conceived of by Kierke­
gaard is both the methodological and existential archetype to be fol­
lowed. Kierkegaards appraisal and, to a certain extent, appropriation of 
Socratic m a ie u tic s  seems to be indisputable,18 especially given the posthu­
mously published L ec tu re s  o n  th e  D ia le c tic s  o f  E th ic a l  a n d  E th ic o -re lig io u s  
C o m m u n ic a t io n  from 1847, found among his journals and papers, which 
are my main textual source for the reading here.
Kierkegaard points out that modern philosophy runs in the wrong 
direction, backwards, ‘away from London’19 or, we should rather say, 
away from Greece. Given this malicious inversion, Kierkegaard strongly 
recommends that it should ‘turn around’ and be sensitive to the method­
ological questions which the Socratic undertaking raises. These ques­
tions have a specific shape not only in Kierkegaard’s conceptual frame­
work but also in his own philosophical project, in his own text, namely: 
(1) a u th o r i t y , (2) r e d u p lic a tio n , and (3) se d u c tio n . Moreover, it will be on 
behalf of these that the ethical and, in my view, ethics itself, will be con­
ceived of as a ch a lle n g e , and as such, for the teacher as well. Let us now 
examine them.
Authority
In general terms, the question of a u th o r i ty  becomes relevant in Kierke­
gaard’s view because it is the c o n d itio  s in e  q u a  n o n  for ethical instruction, 
and because it is paradoxically lacking. Thus in this view, authority 
makes ethical instruction at once possible and impossible, legitimate and
illegitimate. To make this apparent s ta tu s  q u o  productive, we shall expand 
the view upon the notions of red u p lic a tio n  and s e d u c tio n , where authority 
is n o t established epistemologically, that is, it is not determined by 
knowlegde, but p ra g m a tic a lly , by action(s),20 and rh e to r ic a lly , by discourse. 
The issue at stake here concerns the force by which instruction shall be 
addressed; a power which in the case of ‘reduplication’ will be ethically 
accentuated and, in the case of seduction’, aesthetically.
To begin with, given that in his opinion everyone is in possession of 
the ethical in the sense that everyone knows it, Kierkegaard coherently 
disregards all kinds of epistemological authority. ‘In regard to the ethical 
-  he writes in the lectures — proficiency cannot make a master-teacher’.21 
Furthermore, ‘in regard to the ethical, one person cannot have authority 
in relation to the other because, ethically, God is the master-teacher and 
every man is an apprentice’.22 And it is precisely this lack of authority 
that forces the teacher to ‘always dare only indirectly, because he must 
express that he himself is not a master-teacher but an apprentice and (...) 
because he must express that the receiver himself knows it’.23
One concludes that, in the very end, the teacher is also one who is 
being taught, one who is being educated,24 and, not least, one who also 
is being challenged. This egalitarian and reciprocal starting point or fun­
damental position depicts the ideal communicative ‘situation’ given in 
actuality.25 Once we have agreed on the ideal purpose and the actual 
conditions of such concrete situation, that is, once we have respectively 
agreed that the main concern of ethical instruction is to bring about ac­
tion, and that its character is thus mainly challenging, it becomes even 
clearer why the lack of epistemological authority, that is, of a kind of au­
thority which finds its source of legitimation in knowledge or in a very 
particular hesser- W is s e n , as it were, forces a reconception of authority and 
of the communicative structure which legitimately suits ethical instruc­
tion.
Reduplication
Now, what supplies the teacher with the authority to teach the ethical if 
not the mere fact of knowing it? In this respect, Kierkegaard suggests 
elsewhere in his journals that ‘he who himself expresses what he teaches 
is a ‘teacher”, because ‘anyone who does not himself existentially express 
what he teaches, or at least calls attention to this (...) is a Sophist, and all
such communication is sophistry’.26 Indeed, the teacher shall present and 
re-present the doctrine at one and the same time. It is all a matter of ‘in- 
teriorizing the doctrine’27 and bringing it about or red u p lic a tin g  it.
This can obviously not be the place for a broader discussion of the 
notion of Kierkegaardian ‘reduplication’. Nevertheless, in order to clari­
fy my use of the notion in the present text, I shall here refer to Clima- 
cus’ P h ilo so p h ic a l F ra g m e n ts  and P o stsc r ip t as my source of inspiration, if 
not of documentation. According to Climacus’ own use of the terms, 
one must consider first ‘redoubling’ (F o rd o b lin g). He refers to this only 
once in the F r a g m e n ts , and he defines it as ‘the possibility of a coming 
into existence within its own coming into existence. Here, in the stricter 
sense, is the historical, which is the dialectical with respect to time’.28 
This first kind of reduplication is thus placed within the realm of possi­
bility, and it might be thought of as a temporal reiteration. The second 
notion of reduplication is to be found in one of Climacus’ discussions of 
the nature of truth, or, rather, the nature of the language and discourse 
of Christian truth, i.e., the way in which Christian truth is said. Here, 
Climacus explains that ‘none of the formulas says more than that truth 
is, if this is (...) truth is a ‘redoubling’ (F o rd o b le lse ), truth is the first 
[term], but the second [term], the fact that it is, is the same as the first 
one, its being is the abstract form of truth (...) truth is therefore an ab­
stract redoubling (F ord o b le lse ) which is nevertheless canceled at the very 
same moment.’29 This second kind of reduplication seems to affect the 
realm of actuality, i.e., the actual state of affairs, and it might be con­
ceived of as a verbal-semantic reiteration, indeed as a tautology. Finally, 
the third kind of reduplication (R e d u p l ik a t io n ) seems, for Climacus in the 
P o s tsc r ip t, to imply a generic modification or a ‘m e ta b a s is  eis a lio  g e n o s’ as 
Kierkegaard with Aristotle would say, that is, a transformation. In this 
respect, Climacus writes that ‘the reduplication of the content in the 
form is the artistry’.30 More explicitly pertinent to our context, he makes 
clear in a passage devoted to the dialectics of seduction — to which we 
shall return — that the reduplication of truth in existence implies that the 
‘existing individual’ appropriates it and actualizes it.31 Consisting of an 
existential reiteration, ‘reduplication’ thus implies at once the acknowl­
edgement of the infinite distance between ideality and actuality, and this 
is its n e g a tiv e  moment, as well as the need for the bridging of both, this 
being its p o s i t iv e  moment. Given its dialectical structure, ‘reduplication’ 
itself reduplicates, i.e., it actualizes the very structure of the ethical or 
‘last instruction’. In that, according to either one, attention is paid to
both ideality and actuality, which means that the infinite distance be­
tween them and the need to bridge them are concommitantly represent­
ed.
Furthermore, in placing this definition within the context of specific 
ethical instruction, Kierkegaard states that ‘the so-called master-teacher 
s h a ll himself practice what he teaches’32 or, at least, (s)he must always 
‘strive to be that which he communicates’.33 In so doing, that is, by ac­
cepting the challenge of ethics while addressing its demand to acknowl­
edge the gap between ideality and actuality, one tends to bridge it. 
Therefore, rather than conceiving of the ethical as simply a logical or ab­
stract possibility, as a mere ideal or as a doctrine or even as a decalogue, 
but instead as an ontological and concrete possibility to be actualized, 
the teacher acquires the proper, i.e., legitimate ethical authority: namely, 
the authority of e x a m p le .34
Ethical instruction and its underlying communicative strategy, as it is 
presented in the L e c tu re s  o f  th e  E th ic a l  a n d  E th ic o -R e l ig io u s  C o m m u n ic a t io n , 
are consequently conceived of as a specific 7tpoĉ ia (praxis) or a c tio n . It is 
an enterprise where b o th  the teacher and the apprentice, by their own 
agencies, must come to p ra g m a tic a l terms with the ethical they already 
know in order to become its representatives; both must indeed build the 
bridge between the idea(l) and the real, both must ‘exist’ in the ethical.35 
We already saw that only when the ethical undergoes the required ‘actu­
al appropriation’,36 namely, ‘reduplication’ is the ‘second’ ethical instruc­
tion not only made possible but legitimated. At this point, Kierkegaard is 
even more specific, and explains that this is so, because only in this case 
is the teaching of practical philosophy ‘pathos-filled’, and as such, a ‘di­
alectical transition’.37
In short: this Kierkegaardian ‘pathos-filled dialectical transition’ is 
first and foremost interesting because of both its ambivalent and aggluti­
nating force, whereby all dualities are requalified. Firstly, methodologi­
cally speaking, it is within these specific dialectics that imagination and 
actuality, thought and existence, ideality and reality, are brought togeth­
er; however, each of these as such remain apart. Secondly, heuristically 
speaking, we have seen the dialectic relationship between the teacher 
and the apprentice, forged in the heat of Socratic maieutics in order to 
keep them both balanced. Finally, linguistically speaking, the ‘pathos- 
filled dialectical transition’ takes place within discourse, that is, within 
language conceived of in pragmatic terms as action. From this perspec­
tive, this implies concretely that the ‘pathos-filled dialectical transition’
presupposes a non-descriptive or non-demonstrative use of language, 
and, specifically, an e x p re ss iv e  and c o m m u n ic a tiv e  one. If this is right, then 
the ‘pathos-filled dialectical transition’ is to be approached both from the 
(philosophy of language) speech-act theory and from (classical) rhetorical 
theory. In both cases, I insist that it is pressuposed that language is (a 
kind of) action.
Seduction
Thus, we see that language performs or, rather, that a specific perfor­
mance is brought about by discursive means. This we call se d u c tio n . Kier­
kegaard agrees with Socrates that the teacher must have the maieutical 
skills necessary to ‘make the reader or hearer himself active’ in such a 
way that the communication ‘does not end in a result but in a sting’.38 
Language thus p e r fo rm s  a d e m a n d , it co m p els . Linguistic performance of 
this a u th o r ita tiv e  kind, provided by a specific fo r c e , has been studied in the 
philosophy of language and thematized as p e r lo c u tio n  in the theory of 
speech-acts. Let me briefly quote J.L. Austin in his book H o w  to do  th in g s  
w ith  w o rd s, who inaugurated this sort of linguistic analysis, in order to 
make this (his) point clear:
Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain conse­
quential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, 
or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it might be done with the 
design, intention or purpose of producing them; and we may then say 
(...) that the speaker has performed and act (...) We shall call the per­
formance of an act of this kind the performance of a ‘perlocutionary’ 
act, and the act performed (...) ‘perlocution’.39
It seems to me that this quotation clearly affirms Kierkegaard’s view of 
maieutics and, consequently, of legitimate ethical instruction. However, 
linguistically speaking, the core of perlocution is its irregularity, that is, 
its grammatical and, thus, its logical unconventionality (Austin, 121 et 
p a s s im ): its unpredictability. Although the operating rules within lan­
guage, concealed and supported by logic and grammar, constitute its au­
thoritative structure, none of the rules of language can guarantee that 
perlocution is fulfilled, that is, that the hearer reacts to and/or re-pre­
sents what has been said in the expected manner. Hence, no rules can
guarantee, not even in Kierkegaard’s second instruction, that the ethical 
demand will be fulfilled and that ‘reduplication’ will take place. Neither 
logic nor grammar seem to be qualified a u th o r it ie s  for ethical instruction. 
Indeed, ethical instruction must be ‘art-instruction’.40 Over and against 
linguistic correctness and/or accuracy, which the knowledge of logic and 
grammar provide to the discourse, Kierkegaard has suggested p a s s io n , a 
‘pathos-filled’ instruction. By means of passion, by grounding in passion, 
the discourse might rest upon a compelling but, at the same time, n o n ­
a u th o r ita r ia n  communicative strategy. The teacher’s authority is not based 
on his/her mastery of logic or grammar, but, on the very contrary, 
his/her authority is now partially founded on his/her a rtis tic  ability or 
T£%VT| (techne). Climacus affirms in the P o s tc r ip t that when ‘appropria­
tion is (...) the main point, communication is a work of art’, and there­
fore, he adds, there is a need of ‘artistic communication’.41 And 
Kierkegaard, as mentioned before, corroborates this statement by writing 
that ‘the instruction, the communication must be (...) upbringing, prac­
tising, art-instruction’.42
We have now reached the very point where the ‘practical way’ of 
philosophy acquires an artistic character, becoming an aesthetically con­
figured path. As such, it signifies at once a es th e tic  a n d  e th ica l action, gain­
ing a new, authoritative, and ‘passionate’ source, namely rhetoric . The 
ground upon which ethical instruction is now built is called by Johannes 
the Seducer in T h e  S e d u c e r ’s D ia r y  (and by Kierkegaard in his journals) an 
actio (n es) in  d is ta n s .43 Or s e d u c tio n .
Now, conceived of as this specific ac tio (n es) in  d is ta n s  being seduction, 
ethical instruction consists of obtaining an effect (with)in/ from an ‘ob­
ject’, with which there is no direct contact. The effect is caused by the 
inexorable force of the pulling or attracting, but also by the pushing or 
repelling, body or magnet.
Hence the teacher’s authority is now based on his/her stylistically 
and figuratively grounded bi-polar magnetical force, as it were, to de­
ceive the apprentice, to ‘trick [him/her] out of’ ideality and into actuali­
ty by the force of a more or less ‘intentionally persuasive’44 means. Be­
ware that, for our purpose, persuasion (O v e r ta le ls e ) is understood in Kier­
kegaard’s own praising terms as found in A  L ite ra r y  R e v i e w  of Thomasine 
Gyllembourg’s T w o  A g e s . Here, ‘persuasion’ is seen as a momentum of 
passion, as the ‘friendly power’ within literary discourse which super­
sedes ‘captivation and entertainment’,45 and which is ‘so great if one gives 
oneself to it’.46 As opposed to logic and grammar, passion, and thus per­
suasion, does not elude deceit; indeed, Kierkegaard is aware that ethical 
instruction, based as it is on ‘indirect communication first of all involves 
deception’.47
Rhetorically speaking, the teachers authority (and success) depends, 
first of all, on his/her ability to reach the departing, i.e., original ethical 
‘situation’ of the apprentice in actuality, who needs to be singularly con­
sidered; secondly, it depends on the teacher’s ability to suggest that the 
apprentice adheres to the arguments given, in order for the ethical de­
mand to be fulfilled, partly by means of e x e m p l i fy in g  such fulfillment and 
partly by p e r s u a d in g  him/her, by appealing the apprentice, by becoming 
intimate with him/her.48 Once the end of this first, threefold move of at­
traction has been reached, once the teacher has presented before the ap­
prentice the deficiencies in the ethical state of things, that is, the gap be­
tween ideality and actuality which needs to be bridged, repulsion begins. 
Certainly, success depends on the teacher’s ability to get the apprentice 
to ‘begin immediately to do it (...) as well as’ she can on his/her own.49 
This is precisely the ability to tra in  or b r in g  the apprentice u p ,50 to m o v e  
the apprentice into the ethical, to get the apprentice ethically going, as it 
were.
Let me briefly summarize by pointing once more to the dialectical 
structure upon which, according to Kierkegaard, genuine ethical instruc­
tion rests. The discursive strategy underlying ethical instruction echoes 
the dialectical relationship shared by ideality and actuality, as founded on 
a misproportion, which, in its turn, makes explicit a demand. Ethical in­
struction, thus, consists of representing this specific demand of restoring 
the failed relationship between ideality and actuality, stressing actuality as 
the ‘medium’ in which this demand is to be fulfilled. One significant 
obstacle challenges the project as a whole, namely that the required con­
ventional authority to legitimately convey the demand is lacking. The 
‘practical way’ of philosophy reproduces at this point the founding di­
alectics by splitting and adopting two overlapping paths, namely an ethi­
cal and an aesthetic path, with these together creating an ‘artistic’ or pas­
sionate path, namely the path of reduplication or existential reiteration, 
and of seduction or persuasive discourse.
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